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이철기/동국대 국제관계학과 교수
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Prof. Lee Chul-ki
Dongguk University
The waves of military tension and conflict in Northeast Asia are increasing in force. Now that final agreement has been reached on the relocation of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) and the United States Forces Japan (USFJ), the American plan for Asian hegemony, which involves restraining and containing China, has essentially entered its final stages.
On May 1, the foreign and defense ministers of the U.S. and Japan met at the " U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee" (the "2+2 Meeting") and agreed on a final plan for the reorganization and relocation of the USFJ. Of particular note is that the plan calls for the two countries’ forces to be headquartered at the same military installation.
The U.S. army's 1st Corps headquarters will be reorganized into something called a "Unit of Employment" (Uex) at Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture, where the Japanese government will create a body dubbed the "Central Readiness Force Command" out of its Ground Self Defense Force; within this framework, the two will engage in joint operations. Japan will also move its Air Defense Command, part of its Air Defense Force, to Yokota Air Base, where the U.S.'s 5th Air Force is located.
Observers are saying the U.S. and Japan are "integrating" their forces instead of just "strengthening" their alliance. Their agreement reinforces the U.S.-Japan alliance and makes Japan a major military nation. It was already developing a larger military role as a result of the Bush Administration's foreign policy goal of restraining and containing China. Since the earliest days of the Bush Administration, high-ranking foreign policy officials repeatedly said they wanted to see America's alliance with Japan elevated to the level of its alliance with the United Kingdom. America's basic thinking is that it will arm Japan to keep China in check. That necessitates a Japan that is strong militarily. While pursing the reorganization and relocation of the USFJ, it is supporting Japan's becoming a military power as part of its plan to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. And so Japan is going along with America's policy of Asian hegemony, and by doing so it is accomplishing its aspiration of becoming a military power. The U.S. has become the greatest supporter and patron of Japan's military buildup and program to become a powerful militarized nation. In the greater context of Northeast Asia, American troops in Japan and the U.S.-Japan alliance have, so far, been seen as having a positive effect in that they have kept Japan from becoming a military power. That has now been turned on its head. The U.S. had already released Japan from the bonds of being a war crime-committing nation by signing the U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration of 1996, which also opened the way for an expanded Japanese political and military role. With the signing of the declaration, Japan began speeding toward becoming a military power, with both the revision of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and the Japanese Diet's passage of various forms of emergency legislation. Lately the U.S. has been actively supporting the revision of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which has long been the legal mechanism that prevents Japan from becoming a full military power, and the U.S. has also thrown support behind increasing Japan's ability to protect itself beyond its borders by providing it with aerial-refueling aircraft and a light aircraft carrier (CVL). The reinforcement of the U.S.-Japan alliance is not unrelated to the change in the character of the U.S.-Korea alliance being pursued by the Americans. The U.S.'s global strategy and policy for Northeast Asia is to restrain and contain China by creating a three party security cooperation regime that makes the U.S.-Japan alliance its main pillar and the U.S.-Korea alliance the supporting one. Certain conservative media are making a big fuss about this agreement, saying that America's alliance with Japan is getting stronger while its alliance with Korea is doing ever more poorly. They blame the current Roh administration’s "pro North, anti-American tendencies." It should be noted that there has been no sudden reversal of the importance of America's alliance with Korea and its alliance with Japan. Each was always different in importance in the context of American global strategy. As expressed in the U.S.'s East Asian Security Initiative of 1990, the alliance with Japan is a "fundamental" part of U.S. global strategy and a linchpin of its Asia strategy, while the alliance with Korea is merely a support element. However, U.S. policy that seeks to encircle China actually makes Korea more valuable strategically than it used to be. America's alliances with Japan and Korea and U.S. installations in each country are not changing in importance, but rather in role and function. USFJ bases can be said to be a power projection hub (PPH), where military armaments are stored at the rear, while USFK bases are main operating bases (MOB) that play the role of forward deployed positions. This is an arrangement made with China in mind. There is a reason high-tech, permanent bases are being constructed in Osan and Pyeongtaek; the idea is they will be usable for more than 50 years. As president Roh Moo-hyun said in his "Los Angeles comments," the Korean peninsula is "not a place which the U.S. can give up easily, even if is not happy with South Korea, because of its strategic position." The USFK is being reorganized into a regional force for Asia, one that seeks to restrain China, and USFK bases are turning into forward-located bases for encircling China. The additional 11 billion USD in arms and equipment the U.S. is putting on the Korean Peninsula to, as it says, make up for the vacuum created by the reduction in the size of the Second Infantry Division, are actually weapons with defense capabilities such as Patriot missiles and equipment intended for gathering intelligence against China. The U.S. is increasing the number of new Patriot PAC-3 missiles at Osan Air Base and it has stationed them in Kunsan and Kwangju as well. That it is using the Korean peninsula for positioning PAC-3s is evidence that it is targeting China. What we really have to worry about is the fact that we are being firmly incorporated into America's military strategic framework and our security strategy is becoming a sub-system of American Northeast Asia policy, making our military an accessory to American global strategy. This is the effect of an American policy that uses the USFJ as its main component and the USFK as its support component. If this process continues, it might not stop at Korea's military subordination to the U.S. but lead to the incorporation of Korea's military capabilities as a military sub-structure under Japan. American thinking appears to be to tie the U.S.'s Pacific forces, Japan's Self Defense Forces, and the Korean military into one integrated operational command system. The U.S. has essentially already integrated the operational command systems of its own forces and those of Japan, and it is very possible that it will try to incorporate the USFK and the Korean military into the same structure. That would entail ultimately dismantling the Combined Forces Command and rebuilding it. The talk sometimes heard coming from the U.S. military about expanding the functions of the United Nations Command and creating a multinational force is a reflection of that thinking. If this is the case, our security situation could be weakened considerably. This realignment would force the taking of sides in Northeast Asia and open up the possibility of a whole new Cold World order. If there is sustained conflict and confrontation in Northeast Asia, peace and reunification on the Korean Peninsula will forever be a distant goal. Now is the perfect time to reexamine our alliance and security policies, as currently the U.S. is forming a new Northeast Asia strategy and the U.S.-Korea alliance is being reorganized. This could be our last opportunity to escape from our position, subordinate to America's military strategy framework. This is not the time to be making hackneyed calls for a stronger alliance. It is hard to understand how someone could want to strengthen the U.S.-Korea alliance when it is so fundamentally unequal. Korea can have no future-oriented security policy without first engaging in painful reflection about a security policy that has been subordinate to the U.S. We need to look at the situation differently. An independent defense and improved security climate depend on whether or not we can seek an independent framework. Instead of an alliance regime, Northeast Asia needs a multilateral, balanced, and cooperative security regime. That will ultimately depend on how effectively Korea can perform a mediating role in Northeast Asia.
